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doES coSMoPolITAN JuSTIcE EvER  
REquIRE RESTRIcTIoNS oN MIGRATIoN?
José Jorge Mendoza
In today’s world, most people have done nothing either to deserve or be burdened with the citizenship they happen to hold. Most people have acquired their citi-
zenship either by their place of birth or through ancestry (usually inheriting the 
citizenship of one or both of their parents). While most people have citizenship 
in at least one country, not all forms of citizenship can be said to be equal. for 
example, being a citizen of a country in the Global North comes with a greater 
set of opportunities than being a citizen of a country in the Global South. on 
its face, this arbitrary and disproportionate distribution of opportunities seems 
unfair and unjust. A commitment to equality would suggest that these sorts of 
differences be eradicated and that the fairest way to accomplish this task would 
be by eliminating restrictions on migration (i.e., opening borders).
 It might, therefore, come as a surprise to learn that there are some egalitarian 
cosmopolitans who not only find certain restrictions on migration acceptable, but 
also argue that these restrictions are a requirement of cosmopolitan justice. These 
arguments begin by both acknowledging that there are gross and unjustifiable 
forms of global inequality and rejecting the notion that there are any fundamental 
moral differences between citizens and foreigners. Nevertheless, these egalitarian 
cosmopolitans believe that lifting all restrictions on migration would be unjust 
because this would avoidably harm those who, globally speaking, are already the 
most unjustly disadvantaged.
 In this essay, I present a criticism of this position. I argue that even when they 
appear to help, restrictions on migration are usually only an impediment, not an aid, 
to cosmopolitan justice. Even though egalitarian cosmopolitans are well intentioned 
in their support of migration restrictions, I will argue that these restrictions (i) are 
not truly cosmopolitan, and (ii) will not have the kinds of consequences they expect. 
My argument in defense of this claim begins, in section 1, by outlining a version of 
this position as presented by Peter Higgins. I single out Higgins’s account both for 
its thoroughness and because his Priority of disadvantage Principle seems to offer 
the strongest cosmopolitan justification for migration restrictions. In the second 
and third sections of this essay, I reply to the harms Higgins believes are associated 
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with open borders, and provide some reasons as to why restrictions on migration 
are incompatible with cosmopolitan justice.
1. A quick overview of the Egalitarian  
cosmopolitan Argument
In his book Immigration Justice, Peter Higgins suggests that with respect to im-
migration justice, the job of the political philosopher is to “find ways to sort the 
benign [immigration policies] from the irresponsible ones.”1 The reason Higgins 
frames the philosopher’s task in this manner—of separating the benign from the 
irresponsible, as opposed to separating the good from the evil or the right from 
the wrong—is twofold. first, as he correctly points out, states are situated dif-
ferently within the larger global context and, internally, they face very different 
economic, political, and social circumstances. When these factors are taken into 
consideration, it becomes apparent why there is no one good or right immigration 
policy that all states should come to adopt.2
Second, immigration policies, Higgins claims, cannot resolve “many of the 
most pressing moral problems that appear to cause international migration and 
to motivate discussion of the issue.”3 These pressing moral problems, according 
to Higgins, would best be resolved by reforming global institutions and not by 
reforming immigration policies. With that being said, Higgins notes that “states’ 
decisions about how many and which prospective immigrants to admit may have 
grave consequences for economic and human development prospects in poorer 
countries.”4 Therefore, while there is no good or right immigration policy, there 
are a variety of immigration policies that can exacerbate current injustices, and 
we should work to avoid those.
 Higgins contends, correctly, that countries in the Global North today employ 
mostly self-serving immigration policies. Higgins, quoting Stephen castles and 
Mark Miller, believes that these policies function
mainly as a way of mobilizing cheap labour for capital. It perpetuate[s] uneven 
development, exploiting the resources of poor countries, to make the rich richer. 
. . . [l]abour migration [is] one of the main ways in which links of domination 
[are] forged between the core economies of capitalism and its underdeveloped 
periphery. Migration [is] as important as military hegemony and control of 
world trade and investment in keeping the Third World dependent on the first.5
 for Higgins, this backdrop overdetermines the question philosophers ought to 
address when debating the issue of immigration. This question should be: What 
would immigration justice look like in a world such as ours and not in some ideal-
ized utopia where “people’s reasons for wanting to migrate would be anomalous 
and relatively trivial,”6 but in a world where immigration policies function as a 
kind of neo-colonialism?
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As an answer to this question, Higgins proposes the Priority of disadvantage 
Principle (PdP). This principle “holds that just immigration policies may not 
avoidably harm social groups that are already unjustly disadvantaged.”7 on its 
face, there does not seem to be anything exceptional about this principle. It does 
not promise to end world hunger, repair the environment, or bring peace on Earth. 
It does, however, have the virtue of at least not making things any worse. In this 
respect it seems uncontroversial, so one might worry that it will not add much to 
the ongoing immigration debate. After all, who would disagree with a principle 
that says “first do no harm”? Higgins, however, contends that this principle “chal-
lenges the three most common views among political philosophers on immigration 
justice.”8 The first of these is prescriptive nationalism, which “holds that states 
ought to choose immigration policies in accordance with ‘the national interest.’”9
The second is the moral sovereignty of states view, which “holds that states have 
absolute moral discretion with respect to the selection of immigration policies.”10
lastly, there is inclusive cosmopolitanism (i.e., the open borders position), which 
holds “that the moral equality of citizens and foreigners requires states to open 
their borders by eliminating all or most restrictions on immigration.”11
According to Higgins, the PdP poses a challenge to all three of these views. 
With respect to prescriptive nationalism and the moral sovereignty of states view, 
the PdP challenges these accounts because, as a principle of cosmopolitan justice, 
it “reject[s] the notion that states may show favor for citizens over foreigners in 
the selection of immigration polices.”12 In this respect, Higgins’s account is con-
sistent with the standard cosmopolitan rejection of states having a unilateral or 
presumptive right to restrict migration. His account begins to diverge from more 
standard cosmopolitan views on migration, however, when it begins to question 
the actual egalitarian effect that open borders would have. As Higgins writes:
The evidence for the egalitarian global economic effects of open borders is 
essentially speculative. After all, wealthy, liberal states have never permitted 
free migration from much poorer countries in global economic circumstances 
remotely resembling those that obtain today, if they ever have.13
Beyond questioning its egalitarian effects, Higgins also believes that lifting all 
restrictions on migration would avoidably harm those who, globally speaking, 
are already the most unjustly disadvantaged. Higgins provides three reasons for 
why this would be the case. first: “The ability to migrate transnationally demands 
material means that for the most part, only those who are relatively privileged, 
economically and educationally possess.”14 Therefore, since only those who 
already have some means will be able to take advantage of open borders and 
thereby send remittances back home to their family and friends (who, presum-
ably, also are not without means), a lack of restrictions would only increase an 
already drastic inequality among citizens of the Global South. furthermore, not 
only will free migration fail to directly help those who are the most unjustly 
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disadvantaged, but increased remittances will hurt them, since the poorest of 
the poor will have to contend with the increase in inflation that accompanies an 
increase in remittances. In short, not only will free migration not improve the 
situation of the most unjustly disadvantaged, but also, in terms of real money, it 
will decrease their already less-than-a-dollar a day standard of living.
Second, the lifting of restrictions will increase the drain of social resources, in 
particular, the loss of a professional class, in countries of the Global South. As 
Higgins writes:
The emigration of skilled, college educated, middle-class professionals in large 
numbers from relatively poor countries harms those who remain in several 
ways, but, in the most general sense, it does so by undermining prospects for 
human development . . . [and these harms] would surely be magnified in the 
absence of restrictions on immigration.15
The loss of this professional class will, again, disproportionally harm those who 
are already the most unjustly disadvantaged.
 lastly, Higgins claims that most migrants to the Global North are members of 
socially disadvantaged groups who “experience new forms of exploitation in the 
receiving country as both a condition and a consequence of their migration.”16
In other words, members of socially disadvantaged groups who leave the Global 
South do not necessarily find that their lives improve once or as they migrate to 
the Global North. In fact, even if migrants do find more opportunities in the Global 
North, the kinds of harms they might have to endure in order to take advantage 
of these opportunities might far outweigh any benefits they end up receiving. If 
this is so, then it stands to reason that these sorts of avoidable harms to members 
of socially disadvantaged groups would only increase in a world without borders.
 While I agree with Higgins that these three aforementioned problems do indeed 
present real and avoidable harms to those already unjustly disadvantaged, I think 
he goes too far in his endorsement of migration restrictions. In fact, it seems that 
there might be some good reasons to believe that an open borders position could 
account for the PdP. If this is indeed the case—if the PdP and open borders are not 
as incompatible as Higgins makes them out to be—then maybe there are no good 
reasons for why cosmopolitan justice would ever require restrictions on migration.
2. Restrictions, Power differentials, and Social Structures
In the section above, I summarized the three egalitarian problems that Higgins 
raises with open borders. These problems essentially boil down to two sets of 
harms: those harms that affect migrants who are members of socially disadvan-
taged groups and those that effect non-migrating foreigners who are also members 
of socially disadvantaged groups. Both sets of harms are serious, but as I will argue 
in these next two sections, they are either only tangentially related to migration 
or would be largely ameliorated in a world without borders.17
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Beginning with the first set of harms, Higgins is correct that as things stand, 
migration is not always good to members of socially disadvantaged groups, in 
particular women and people of color. In today’s world, migrants who happen to be 
members of socially disadvantaged groups suffer various forms of exploitation and 
discrimination. These harms can be so severe that one might reasonably conclude 
that in today’s world, they might have been better-off not having migrated in the 
first place. for many undocumented immigrants, this is very much the case, but 
Higgins goes on to show that this is the case even for many lawful immigrants. 
Lawful immigrants, he argues, are subjected to various injustices “at the hands 
of brokers, recruiters, employers, and migration officials.”18 If correct, this seems 
to suggest that more mobility, which open borders would obviously offer, might 
not only not make things better for socially disadvantaged migrants, but could 
make things worse. If this is correct, then this gives us a very good cosmopolitan 
reason for favoring certain restrictions on migration.
 The problem, however, is that this assessment seems to gloss over an important 
difference between “privilege” and “right.” As things currently stand, non-citizens 
only have a privilege, not a right, to migrate to places like the united States. This 
privilege (a) must therefore be obtained, and (b) is always subject to being revoked. 
Because of power differentials, which these privileges both create and are embedded 
in, members of socially disadvantaged groups have been forced to suffer various 
injustices in order to obtain and also retain permission to migrate. In a world with-
out borders, however, this would no longer be the case. In such a world, members 
of socially disadvantaged groups would have a right to be present, and this right 
would not need to be obtained nor would it be subject to be revoked. This shift 
from a privilege to a right would significantly lessen, if not eliminate, the power 
that brokers, recruiters, employers, and migration officials currently enjoy over 
immigrants. In short, while it is abundantly clear how migration restrictions can 
be used to harm or manipulate members of already disadvantaged social groups 
(e.g., women and people of color), it is not as clear how removing the threat of 
deportation (which is what open borders would do) does the same.
 Higgins’s worry, however, is still not completely addressed. While it might 
take away some of the power that brokers, recruiters, employers, and migration 
officials currently enjoy, opening borders will not put an end to larger and more 
ubiquitous structures of oppression such as patriarchal and racist social structures. 
In places like the united States, these structures are alive and well, and continue 
to disproportionately (and avoidably) harm anyone who belongs to a socially 
disadvantaged group. Higgins is right to be worried about this because even if 
immigrants are not harmed as immigrants, they can still be harmed as women and 
as people of color, and in that case, we might still have a situation where socially 
disadvantaged migrants are jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire.
 In this case, however, the harm in question seems to go beyond the scope of im-
migration justice. Justice, in a general sense, requires that structures of patriarchy 
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and racism be addressed, but there is a limit to what immigration policies can do 
to bring about these changes. Higgins recognizes this and, for that reason, argues 
that members of socially disadvantaged groups, for their own good, should be 
restricted from migrating. Higgins defends his view against the charge of pater-
nalism, by suggesting that restrictions on migration are, at least in these sorts 
of cases, analogous to not letting someone enter our home when we are sick. In 
these sorts of cases, we are keeping people out, not because it benefits us, but 
because we don’t want to do harm to them.19
There is no denying that Higgins’s view has a certain practicality to it; if 
something is harmful (e.g., an unstable cliff), then there is nothing unjust (or 
paternalistic) about placing barriers around it in an effort to prevent others from 
entering the area and getting hurt. The problem with extrapolating this kind of 
reasoning to cases of discrimination and exploitation is that it takes something 
that is “given” (e.g., an unstable cliff) to be sufficiently similar to our current 
social structures (e.g., a dual-labor market), when in fact they are not the same at 
all. With respect to the former, very little can be done to repair the situation, so 
keeping people away might be the best that can be expected. Social structures, 
on the other hand, are not like this. furthermore, social structures are not simply 
in need of repair, but are also reproduced by and in our daily actions. Therefore, 
responding to social structures with restrictions will not only not help to repair 
them, but could in fact aid in their reproduction. for example, imagine a company 
or a school that is extremely racist and sexist. Would restricting the access of 
women and people of color to that company or school, even if it is for their own 
good, not simply aid in reproducing the injustice? It is true that open borders will 
not solve the larger underlying problem of unjust social structures, but restrict-
ing the movement of the socially disadvantaged will not solve it either. In fact, 
we have good reason to suspect (and an abundant amount of historical examples 
to confirm) that restricting the movement of women and people of color only 
perpetuates these sorts of unjust social structures.
3. Responding to Brain drain
Even if we can account for this first set of harms, Higgins also believes that 
open borders would present harms for non-migrating members of socially dis-
advantaged groups. In this section, I will look at this set of harms by addressing 
what is likely the most serious objection to open borders: the problem of “brain 
drain.” The problem of brain drain begins from the uncontestable fact that in to-
day’s world, the best and brightest of the Global South are immigrating in large 
numbers to countries in the Global North. This has created an abysmal situation 
where countries that are in dire need of professionals, such as doctors, not only 
have a hard time attracting these much-needed professionals, but are at the same 
time hemorrhaging them to countries that do not have nearly the same need for 
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them. This situation has, again, disproportionally harmed those who, globally 
speaking, are already the most unjustly disadvantaged.20 Higgins believes that if 
borders were opened, the current situation would only be exacerbated. Therefore, 
he reasons that cosmopolitan justice would require restrictions on professionals 
migrating from the Global South to the Global North.21
While I concede that brain drain is real and presents a serious problem, I’m 
not convinced that immigration restrictions are (a) the preferred option to address 
this problem, and (b) that they would ameliorate, rather than worsen, the current 
situation. To show why I believe this is the case, I will employ an alternative way 
to deal with brain drain, which I call the “deportation option.” While I do not 
seriously endorse this option, I contrast it to what I call Higgins’s “restrictions 
option” for two reasons. first, as absurd as the deportation option is, it presents as 
good an—if not a better—alternative for dealing with the problem of brain drain 
than does the implementation of restrictions. Second, the restrictions option has 
a lot of serious flaws, but these flaws only come to light when contrasted with an 
equally dubious response to brain drain.
So, for the moment, let us assume that the flight of professionals from the 
Global South to the Global North does indeed present a harm to those who are 
already the most unjustly disadvantaged.22 Why would a cosmopolitan response 
to brain drain be restrictions on migration? Why instead would it not require, as 
absurd as this might sound, that professionals from the Global North be deported 
to the Global South?23 Well, the most obvious reason is that deporting citizens 
is a prima facie violation of human rights. This is true, but it is also true that 
denying persons the right to exit is a violation of human rights. for example, the 
united Nations declaration of Human Rights protects such a right under Article 
13.2. Some might try (although Higgins does not) to get around this problem by 
suggesting that these restrictions could be reframed as immigration restrictions 
and not emigration restrictions, but that seems disingenuous. After all, these re-
strictions are not so much about a community trying to keep certain individuals 
out (i.e., immigration restrictions), as much as they are about not letting certain 
individuals leave (i.e., emigration restrictions). Therefore, while the deportation 
option is not any better with respect to human rights, it at least is not any worse 
than the restrictions option. Another way to think about it is as follows: if some-
thing is morally weighty enough to override a person’s right to exit, it stands to 
reason that it should also be morally weighty enough to override a person’s right 
to remain.
 Even if this is true, we might still want to ask what the consequences of the 
deportation option would be, as opposed to the consequences of the restrictions 
option. What would happen if the united States really did begin to deport doctors 
to Africa? Well, the consequences seem pretty obvious. I don’t think that African 
nations would suddenly see an increase in doctors, so much as Americans might 
stop going to medical school altogether. After all, who would want to invest all 
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their time and money if the end result would be a deportation order? Therefore, 
from a strictly consequentialist point of view, the idea of deporting profession-
als from the Global North to the Global South seems like a well-intentioned but 
dubious enterprise. This option would not achieve its intended result of helping 
the most disadvantaged, but, as counterintuitive as it might seem, it would end up 
harming everyone, in the long run, by reducing the overall number of available 
doctors.
This last problem, however, is not just a problem for the deportation option. 
It is also a problem for the restrictions option. If going to medical school would 
take away one’s right to exit—as opposed to offering a ticket out of the Global 
South—then we could equally ask: Why would anyone, especially citizens of 
the Global South, go to medical school? Higgins addresses a related concern 
toward the end of his book when he considers the following objection: “many 
residents of poor countries are motivated to pursue advanced education [only 
for the] prospect of migration to wealthy countries.”24 Higgins’s reply to such an 
objection is to point out that many residents of poor countries pursue advanced 
education without ever intending to migrate. It therefore stands to reason that 
these same folks would not “forgo advanced education in the absence of the op-
tion of international migration.”25
The problem I’m suggesting, however, is different from the objection Higgins 
has responded to. I agree that people do not need the possibility of migration to 
motivate them to pursue an advanced education. The worry I’m raising is that the 
prospect of losing one’s right to exit will serve as a deterrent to those who might 
otherwise have pursued an advanced education, even if they originally had no 
plans to emigrate. While I agree that restrictions on migration will not discourage 
everyone from pursuing an advanced education—especially when there are less 
attractive alternatives in the Global South than there are in the Global North—it 
will still have the unintended consequence of discouraging enough people so that 
countries in the Global South might, because of these restrictions, end up with 
fewer rather than more professionals.
So while neither option so far seems very appealing, the deportation option does 
have one advantage over the restrictions option: it is more truly cosmopolitan. 
cosmopolitanism requires that states not show favor for citizens over foreigners, 
but it also rejects the notion that compatriots have special duties to each other 
that they do not share with others. In this regard, the deportation option, unlike 
the restrictions option, puts professionals from the Global South on equal footing 
with professionals from the Global North. By preventing immigrants from apply-
ing for professional jobs in places like the united States, the restrictions option 
comes close to adopting a kind of anti-cosmopolitan position. first, professionals 
from the Global South are being asked to bear a disproportionate amount of the 
burden necessary to achieve global justice simply because they happen to be citi-
zens of a country in the Global South. Second, citizens of countries in the Global 
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North who are seeking professional jobs in places like the united States would 
be protected from non-Global North competition, simply because they happen 
not to be citizens of a country in the Global South. The deportation option, on 
the other hand, not only does away with this unearned privilege that citizens of 
the Global North enjoy, but it would also ask citizens of the Global North to do 
their part in helping to bring about global justice.
In the end, both the deportation and restrictions options seem like well-inten-
tioned, but nonetheless wrongheaded ways of dealing with brain drain. In order 
to properly deal with brain drain, we first need to understand that there is the 
difference between “poaching” and “free movement.” While I agree that there is 
something troubling about policies that allow already-wealthy countries to poach 
much-needed professionals from poor countries, this injustice goes beyond im-
migration policy. As the phenomenon of “brain waste” (e.g., when immigrants 
from the Global South with advanced degrees end up working menial jobs in the 
Global North) shows, professionals from the Global South are willing to come 
to the Global North, even when they are not actively recruited. In other words, 
professionals from the Global South who want to migrate to the Global North 
have shown that they are willing to immigrate even if it means losing their status 
as professionals. Therefore, it is not clear that putting restrictions on profession-
als, as professionals, would necessarily curtail their flight.
Addressing the injustice of brain drain requires a radical transformation of 
global conditions and institutions such that countries in the Global South are not 
only able to retain their local homegrown professionals, but can also begin to at-
tract professionals from the Global North. What we need are not ways to coerce 
professionals to stay or go to work in the Global South, but a way to create a 
situation in which professionals would freely choose to do so: where profession-
als are there because they have bought in, not because they have been trapped 
or banished there. As I’ve tried to show here, immigration restrictions (just like 
deportations) will not help in this endeavor, and in fact, they are more likely to 
do harm.26
conclusion
There is a near consensus among economists that, to varying degrees, open borders 
would dramatically increase global economic growth. Egalitarian cosmopolitans, 
such as Higgins, do not so much question this conclusion as much as they ques-
tion how this economic growth will be distributed, and they have good reason 
to be suspicious. As recent free-trade agreements have shown, opening borders 
to capital, goods, and services has not benefited unjustly disadvantaged social 
groups. In fact, members of those groups have disproportionately (and avoidably) 
borne the brunt of the ills that accompany these agreements. This worry seems 
to motivate much of the skepticism that certain egalitarian cosmopolitans have 
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for open borders. To them, open borders seem like the final nail in a neoliberal 
coffin. While it is true that libertarian policies have not been kind to the globally 
disadvantaged, it is also important to keep in mind that even a broken clock can 
be right twice a day.
Egalitarian cosmopolitans are correct that with respect to immigration justice, 
their views challenge both prescriptive nationalists and proponents of the moral 
sovereignty of states view. They are also correct in questioning the egalitarian 
potential of liberalized borders, especially as it concerns the liberalization of 
trade. Egalitarian cosmopolitans would be mistaken, however, if they believe 
that migration restrictions can bring about benefits or reduce harms. As the last 
two sections have shown, restrictions on migration only contribute to already 
existing power differentials that negatively affect the globally disadvantaged. 
These restrictions do not challenge—and in fact, they might even help perpetu-
ate—unjust social structures. lastly, restrictions are more likely to hurt than to 
help globally disadvantaged non-migrating foreigners. Therefore, there seems to 
be no good reason for immigration justice, at least from a cosmopolitan point of 
view, to ever require restrictions on migration. The harms associated with migra-
tion are mainly symptoms of larger injustices, and by using immigration policy 
to respond to these symptoms, we risk not only failing to get at the root of the 
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13. Ibid., 62. on a side note, this is not completely accurate. As late as 1965, the 
united States had an open borders policy with all countries in the Western Hemisphere.
14. Higgins, Immigration Justice, 63.
15. Ibid., 67.
16. Ibid., 65.
17. Amy Reed-Sandoval hints at a very similar objection in her brilliant review of 
Higgins’s book. See Reed-Sandoval, Review of Immigration Justice.
18. Higgins, Immigration Justice, 66.
19. Ibid., 71–72.
20. Kieran oberman presents a compelling argument against most brain drain argu-
ments, but because his argument is grounded on an appeal to individual autonomy and is 
anti-consequentialist in nature, Higgins’s version of the brain drain argument is largely 
immune to oberman’s overall criticism. See oberman, “can Brain drain Justify Immigra-
tion Restrictions?”
21. lea ypi makes a similar argument, but unlike Higgins, her use of the brain drain 
argument is not so much aimed at justifing restrictions on migration, as it is to show that 
a theory of immigration justice grounded in egalitarian principles leads to a contradiction. 
ypi ultimately wants to argue that we should abandon all attempts to ground immigration 
justice in egalitarian principles. ypi’s concerns are worth mentioning here, but because 
Higgins and I are both in agreement that cosmopolitian egalitarianism can ground a theory 
of immgration justice, these worries are beyond the scope of this essay. See ypi, “Justice 
in Migration.”
22. I say “assume” here because it is still very much a live question among econo-
mists and social scientists as to whether the exit of professionals also has some positive 
consequences that might balance out or even outweigh the negative effects of brain drain. 
for example, professionals who emigrate from the Global South to the Global North of-
ten send remittances or return to their home countries with new technologies/skills. See 
Moses, International Migration, 173–76; and Brock and Blake, debating Brain drain, 
160–67. Higgins does provide his readers with some very good reasons to be wary of 
these arguments, but he by no means definitively disproves them.
23. This “deportation option” is a kind of conglomeration of Michael Blake’s “kid-
napped foreigner” and “in-kind transfers” examples that also inverts Gillian Brock’s 
suggestion that “compulsory service programs” can be used to address brain drain. See 
Brock and Blake, debating Brain drain.
24. Higgins, Immigration Justice, 224.
25. Ibid.
26. In this regard, my view is very much in agreement with Alex Sager’s who argues 
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that: “Rather than focusing on the permissibility of migration restrictions for skilled 
workers, we should ask what institutions must be put in place so that migration will not 
have harmful effects and interact with other policies to make people better off.” See Sager, 
“Reframing the Brain drain,” 560. I also endorse most, if not all, the suggestions made 
by Michael Blake. See Brock and Blake, debating Brain drain, 208–28.
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